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SERVICE OF PROCESS AND EXECUTION OF
JUDGMENT ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS
Robert Laurence*
I. The Problem Stated
Indian debtor; non-Indian creditor; reservation transaction.
Default. Creditor sues debtor in state court. Williams v. Lee1
stands for the proposition that dismissal of the suit is ap-
propriate, as the state court is without subject matter jurisdiction.
No matter that the court has personal jurisdiction; no matter that
proper service of process was accomplished off the reservation.
No subject matter jurisdiction, a defect that may not be waived2
and which may be raised by the trial or appellate court sua
sponte.3
That much is clear; Williams v. Lee is squarely in point. The
ungrammatical, almost head-note style (much to the consterna-
tion of the Editor of this Review, I might add) is used to indicate
the noncontroversial, settled nature of this point. Thus, in many
cases, the issue this article addresses is moot. Service of process
does nothing for a plaintiff when there is no subject matter
jurisdiction. Likewise, no enforceable judgment will be obtained
if no subject matter jurisdiction existed.'
© 1983 Robert Laurence
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas. This article draws heavily
on a presentation by the author before the Federal Bar Association's Eighth Indian Law
Conference in Phoenix, Apr. 14, 15, 1983.
1. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
2. Subject matter jurisdiction is a defect that may not be waived by a party (see
note 3, infra, and FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)), but it may, of course, be lost. That is to say,
a defendant may object to subject matter jurisdiction at trial, lose and fall to appeal or
lose and lose again on appeal. In either of these cases the objection to subject matter
jurisdiction is lost. See, e.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963).
3. See, e.g., Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884);
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); P. BATOR et al., HART & WECHLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 835-36 (2d ed. 1973).
4. It is not precisely accurate to say that lack of subject matter jurisdiction will
necessarily mean no enforceable judgment will be obtained. Suppose Lee, in state court,
sues Williams, an Indian, over an on-reservation debt. Williams does not object to subject
matter jurisdiction and does not appeal from the judgment for Lee. Is the judgment en-
forceable? The analysis depends upon where the plaintiff seeks enforcement:
(A) In the court where the original suit was brought. The judgment is enforceable, but
in many states the defendant may halt enforcement by having the judgment set aside. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b): "the court may relieve a party... from a final judgment ... for
the following reasons: ... (4) the judgment is void .... The motion shall be made within
a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one year after the judg-
ment ... was entered or taken." Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be grounds for
257
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Let us assume away that problem: suppose proper subject mat-
ter jurisdiction exists in state court. Suppose the debt transaction
arose off the reservation. Suppose a tort was committed off the
reservation. Suppose a sale is made off the reservation. But sup-
pose further that by the time the plaintiff brings suit, the defend-
ant is physically within the boundaries of a reservation. Can the
court get personal jurisdiction? How? Suppose personal jurisdic-
tion is obtained and judgment is given for the plaintiff. Can this
judgment be enforced against property on the reservation? How?
These are the questions this article addresses.
Focusing our attention on service of process and execution of
judgment may seem odd, at first glance. The two events are, after
all, at opposite ends of the litigation spectrum, but they are
related enough to justify an analysis in one article. First, both
events are essentially procedural and raise issues distinguishable
from the subject matter concerns of Williams v. Lee and its pro-
geny.' Second, in both events the underlying issue is the applica-
tion of state law on the reservation-by the sheriff or private
server serving process and by the sheriff executing on a judgment.
Third, there is something of a slippery slope between the two.
There is an understandable reluctance on the part of a state court
judge to find service proper when the result is a valid judgment
a judgment's being void. Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 624
F.2d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 955. The test is whether
"there is a 'total want of jurisdiction' as distinguished from 'an error in the exercise of
jurisdiction.' " Id., quoting Lubben v. Selective Service System, 453 F.2d 645, 649 (1st
Cir. 1972). Hence, if the court wrongly decides the jurisdictional issue, the judgment may
not be set aside, but if the court does not address the issue, it might be.
(B) In the court of a sister state. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963), held that
"once the matter has been fully litigated and judicially determined, it can[notj be retried
in another State in litigation between the same parties." Id. at 115. Thus, the result ap-
pears to be the same: if the jurisdictional question was fully and fairly litigated at the trial
level, it may not be collaterally attacked on enforcement in another jurisdiction. If not,
then full faith and credit does not compel foreign enforcement.
(C) In an Indian tribal court. The analysis is similar as in (B), with the additional
complication of the application of full faith and credit to Indian tribes. See infra text ac-
companying notes 69-88.
In summary, the original "Lee v. Williams" hypothetical situation left the subject mat-
ter jurisdiction question unraised and unlitigated at trial and on appeal. On enforcement
in the forum state, rule 60(b)(4) should be available. On enforcement in a foreign state,
full faith and credit concerns should not block collateral attack. On enforcement in tribal
court, full faith and credit is even more problematical and the defendant should be able to
halt enforcement.
5. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (per curiam); Kennerly v. District
Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971) (per curiam).
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that is unenforceable somewhere within the state. The events are
distinguishable and the situation described is exactly the one that
prevails, but the reluctance that one sees in the cases6 to treat ser-
vice of process and execution of judgment differently justifies the
discussion of both in one article. The issues are, then, how may
process be served and how may judgments be enforced on the
reservation?
II. Service of Process on the Reservation
In Public Law 280 States
Public Law 280 was an act of Congress that permitted some
states and required others to assume civil and criminal jurisdic-
tion over Indian country.' Appendix I lists the states that have
assumed Public Law 280 jurisdiction.' Generally speaking, they
are not the states with the largest Indian reservations.
As Bryan v. Itasca County9 made clear, albeit in dicta,10 a state
that has assumed Public Law 280 jurisdiction has avoided the
Williams v. Lee subject matter jurisdiction problem and may ap-
ply its rules of decision even in suits involving reservation transac-
tions. It would seem to go without saying that such a state's ser-
vice of process statute could be validly applied on the reservation.
If not, then notwithstanding Bryan's approval of the lawsuit in
state court with determination under state law, the defendant
could still find sanctuary on the reservation. True, Public Law
6. See, e.g., Lonewolf v. Lonewolf, 657 P.2d 627, 628 (N.M. 1982): "Once the
district court had jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage, it had jurisdiction to determine
proper distribution of the parties' community personal property." See also Little Horn
State Bank v. Stops, 170 Mont. 510, 555 P.2d 211, 212 (1976):
It has been a long standing doctrine that any court having jurisdiction to render a
judgment also has the power to enforce that judgment through any order or writ
necessary to carry its judgment into effect.... The property subject to the writ was
located within Big Horn County, the writ was directed to the sheriff of Big Horn
County, and all other essential elements of a valid writ of execution existed.
7. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588.
8. The assumption of Public Law 280 jurisdiction remains a possibility, but since
1968 the consent of the tribes concerned has been required. Such consent is not typically
forthcoming.
9. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
10. The precise issue in Bryan was whether a Public Law 280 state might tax reserva-
tion property. The Court held no, but stated that section 4(a) of the Act "authorizes ap-
plication by the state courts of their rules of decision to decide such [civil] disputes." 426
U.S. at 384, citing Israel & Smithson, Indian Taxation, Tribal Sovereignty and Economic
Development, 49 N.D. L. REv. 267, 296 (1973).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1982
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
280 did not terminate the reservation" and not all state laws ap-
ply there,' 2 but it is difficult to imagine that Congress would
legislate to remove the barrier to subject matter jurisdiction while
retaining a similar barrier to personal jurisdiction. This writer
concludes, then, that in Public Law 280 states, process may be
served on the reservation under state law.
In Non-Public Law 280 States
When Public Law 280 jurisdiction has not been assumed, the
state court obtains subject matter jurisdiction, not by congres-
sional grant, but by common law permission provided the trans-
action sued over is off-reservation. 3 What of personal jurisdic-
tion? Service of process under state statute or rule on the reserva-
tion should be seen as an attempted application of state law on
the reservation, subject to the familiar two-step analysis: (1) Does
that application run afoul of any congressional enactment
(hereafter "preemption" or "supremacy")? (2) Does that ap-
plication "infringe upon the Indians' right to make their own
laws and be ruled by them" (hereafter denoted by references to
Williams or infringement)?
Thus the first issue is whether any federal statute prohibits the
application of a state service of process statute or rule on the
reservation. None comes to mind and no case has ever so held,
but the enigmatic Kennerly v. District Court'4 requires that the
possible preempting effect of Public Law 280 be considered even
in those states that have not assumed jurisdiction thereunder. Is
assumption under Public Law 280 the only way a state may exer-
cise jurisdiction on the reservation? Though Kennerly rather ex-
pressly says so,' 5 it should probably not be read so broadly. In-
11. See, e.g., Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 488 n.32 (1979).
12. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1976).
13. The issue of the existence vel non of subject matter jurisdiction in state court
when the transaction occurred off the reservation is beyond the scope of this article, but it
is assumed throughout that such jurisdiction does exist. No United States Supreme Court
case has directly so held, but Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) and
Central Mach. Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980), both taxation cases,
strongly suggest that result. See State Securities, Inc. v. Anderson, 84 N.M. 629, 506 P.2d
786 (1973), discussed infra with respect to personal jurisdiction.
14. 400 U.S. 423 (1971) (per curiam).
15. "The Court in Williams. . . .noted that 'essentially, absent governing Acts of
Congress. . . .' With regard to the particular question of the extension of state jurisdic-
tion over civil causes of action . . . there was, ...a 'governing Act of Congress, i.e.
[Pub. L. 280].' "
[Vol. 10
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deed, to do so would be to render Williams v. Lee superfluous, a
proposition that flies in the face of recent Supreme Court citation
of that landmark case.16 Public Law 280 should not be read to
have so sweeping a preemptive effect.
Finding that Public Law 280 does not answer all Indian
jurisdiction problems does not itself settle the matter, of course.
Williams v. Lee stands ready to strike offensive state law even
where no conflicting federal statute is found. 7 Does service of
process on the reservation infringe upon Indian self-government?
Let us hypothesize such an infringement: Suppose a tribe, fear-
ful of breaches of the peace, determines that process may be
served on the reservation only by a tribal law enforcement officer
who must place the summons in the defendant's hand. Suppose
further that the state in which that tribe resides has a very liberal
rule allowing the summons to be tacked on the defendant's door
by any disinterested adult. Plaintiff chooses Ace Process Servers,
Inc., whose agent visits the defendant's reservation home and
posts the summons. Is the service valid?"8 Williams v. Lee sug-
gests that it is not. The tribe has made a legitimate policy choice
and the application of the more liberal state rule on the reserva-
tion frustrates that choice. Indeed, many of the most sensitive
services will come in just the context of an off-reservation
lawsuit. To allow the state rule to control here would infringe
upon Indian self-government at least as much as to allow the
Arizona court to adjudicate Lee's suit against Williams.
No case has been found that brings the hypothetical situation
to life, but it is not difficult to find one ripe for such a contro-
versy. New Mexico's service of process rule is not so liberal as the
hypothetical one, but it allows service on a defendant other than
by a law enforcement officer.' 9 The Jicarilla Apache Tribe, on
the other hand, requires that civil process be served by a
disinterested police officer.20 Suppose then that Smith sues Fast
16. See, e.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 103 S.Ct. 2378, 2385-86
(1983); Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 485 U.S. 832,
843, 848 (1982); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142, 145, 151
(1980).
17. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
18. There is, of course, a due process inquiry as to whether such posting gives the
defendant adequate notice. The reservation location would appear not to affect this ques-
tion and it need not be explored here.
19. N.M. R. Civ. P. 4(d).
20. Jicarilla Law & Order Code, ch. II, § 4(c). This statute gives the rule for service
of process in tribal court. The Code does not speak to service on the reservation for an
off-reservation suit. It seems that it might, in which case the Williams argument would be
even stronger.
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Horse2 in New Mexico court over an off-reservation cause of ac-
tion. Smith serves process on Fast Horse in a manner that meets
the New Mexico requirements but that would not be sufficient if
the suit were brought in tribal court. Is the service good?
At this point it is important to distinguish two inquiries. First,
did Fast Horse receive adequate notice of the suit in the New
Mexico court? If not, then the due process clause of the United
States Constitution requires dismissal. Here, the answer is prob-
ably that notice was sufficient. The New Mexico service statute,
we may assume, is constitutional; it comports with due process; it
provides the notice the Constitution requires, and the reservation
location of the defendant is immaterial to that question of notice.
But the teaching of Williams v. Lee is that, when a reservation
is involved, there is an inquiry beyond due process; there is an in-
terest to be protected other than the defendant's right to notice of
the suit. That interest is the tribe's right to "make its own laws
and be ruled by them." ' 22 This is an interest that has little to do
with the defendant's right to receive fair notice of the suit against
him. The interest is the tribe's, not the individual's,"1 and here
the tribe's legitimate choice to require service by a tribal police
officer has been frustrated by application of New Mexico law on
the reservation.
It is not suggested that the result is foretold, and there are
arguments the other way. It could be said, indeed, that New Mex-
ico law is not being applied on the reservation, that the effect of a
service of process rule is to say what must be done in order for
the suit to continue off the reservation and, if those acts are
21. It is intended that names of the parties indicate their races, and indeed many of
the most difficult problems come in interracial conflicts such as that hypothesized. See,
e.g., Annis v. Dewey County Bank, 335 F. Supp. 133 (D.S.D. 1971); Francisco v. State,
113 Ariz. 427, 556 P.2d 1 (1976); State Securities, Inc. v. Anderson, 84 N.M. 629, 506
P.2d 786 (1973). But see, e.g., Bad Horse v. Bad Horse, 163 Mont. 445, 517 P.2d 893,
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 847. (1974).
Suppose both litigants are non-Indians. Theoretically the analysis is the same, and the
tribe's policy against potential breaches of the peace is just as much frustrated when a
non-Indian defendant is served by a private party. United States Supreme Court authority
suggests otherwise. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946);
Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896).
Suppose the defendant is an Indian but not a member of the tribe on whose reservation
service is being made. Such problems are dealt with briefly in the Colville case, 447 U.S.
134, 160-61 (1980).
22. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 171-72 (1973), quoting
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1959).
23. Rolette County v. Eltobgi, 221 N.W.2d 645 (N.D. 1974).
[Vol. 10
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done, wherever they are done, then the New Mexico court may
continue with the suit. Furthermore, the Jicarilla rule does not
say that service of process for a New Mexico suit must be under-
taken by a police officer, but rather that a service of process for a
Jicarilla suit must be so done. Nevertheless, on balance it appears
that, at least in the New Mexico-Jicarilla hypothetical example,
Williams requires that service by a private person on the reserva-
tion should be invalid.
The cases addressing the issue are split and, generally speaking,
unenlightening. Two cases have directly held that service on the
reservation was improper,2" not because of any federal barrier
but because the state sheriff had no authority on the reservation.
In both cases state law required service to be undertaken by a
sheriff in his official capacity and both courts found a sheriff to
be without official capacity on the reservation.25 Several other
courts have opined in unexplained dicta that reservation service is
improper. 6
Three cases have held service on the reservation to be proper,27
24. Francisco v. State, 113 Ariz. 427, 556 P.2d 1 (1976); Martin v. Denver Juvenile
Court, 177 Colo. 261, 493 P.2d 1093 (1972).
25. This may understate the importance of the two cases a bit. Read narrowly, the
two cases say that service of process was invalid because a statute required service by a
sheriff acting in his official capacity and neither sheriff could do so on the reservation.
Stripped of their offices, the sheriffs were private process servers, and service by such a
person is insufficient under state law. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the question of the
sheriff's status, official or not, on the reservation is similar to the basic service of process
question under discussion. The courts' opinions show that. See Francisco v. State, 113
Ariz. 427, 429-30, 556 P.2d 1, 3-4 (1976); Martin v. Denver Juvenile Court, 177 Colo.
261, 263-64, 493 P.2d 1093, 1094 (1972). It is interesting to note that the Arizona
Supreme Court, in its decision in the famous Williams v. Lee, 83 Ariz. 241, 319 P.2d 998
(1958), rev'd 358 U.S. 217 (1959), decided this issue of state/federal law differently. Ser-
vice of process was made on the reservation in that case, apparently by the sheriff, and
the Arizona Supreme Court had no difficulty finding it proper. 83 Ariz. at 224, 319 P.2d
at 1000. Prejudgment attachment was also made on the reservation. This the state court
found impermissible under federal law. 83 Ariz. at 247-48, 319 P.2d at 1002-03, citing 25
C.F.R. § 277.13.
26. Langford v. Montieth, 102 U.S. 145, 147 (1880); Annis v. Dewey County Bank,
335 F. Supp. 113, 136 (D.S.D. 1971); Commissioner v. Brun, 286 Minn. 43, 53, 174
N.W.2d 120, 126 (1970); County of Beltrami v. County of Hennepin, 264 Minn. 406,
415-16, 119 N.W.2d 25, 32 (1963).
27. Bad Horse v. Bad Horse, 163 Mont. 445, 517 P.2d 893, cert. denied, 419 U.S.
847 (1974); State Securities, Inc. v. Anderson, 84 N.M. 629, 506 P.2d 786 (1973); LeClair
v. Powers, 632 P.2d 370 (Okla. 1981), See also Kromer v. Sullivan, 88 S.D. 567, 225
N.W.2d 591 (1975), in which the defendant sought to vacate a default judgment on the
grounds that service on the reservation under state law was improper. The trial court
refused to vacate and the South Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded on a pro-
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but in none of these is the issue framed as clearly as in the
hypothetical. In State Securities, Inc. v. Anderson,2" the New
Mexico Supreme Court's discussion of service of process is inex-
tricably intertwined with the discussion of whether the state court
has subject matter jurisdiction over the suit on notes made off-
reservation. The court concludes: "We believe that state jurisdic-
tion is proper in cases between Indians and non-Indians involving
contractual obligations incurred off the reservation and we hold
that process may be served on Indians while they are within the
boundaries of the reservation." 2 9 However, the discussion of pre-
emption and infringement does not support the second half of the
conclusion. The court introduces this discussion with reference to
service of process," ° but the diversion of the court's attention to
the subject matter of the suit is shown by its preliminary conclu-
sion: "In this case there is not a proprietary interest in land, one
Indian is not suing another Indian and the transaction did not
arise in Indian country." 3' These factors, of course, concern the
state court's ability to hear the suit at all and have little to do
with the manner in which the plaintiff served process on the
defendant. The court does not discuss factors relevant to service,
nor does it mention the tribe's service statute. The New Mexico
Supreme Court apparently assumed that personal jurisdiction
tags along with subject matter jurisdiction and that a discongruity
between the state and tribal service rules poses no issue at all.32
cedural issue, without reaching the merits of the defendant's argument. The concurring
justice thought the service was proper because the underlying transaction occurred off the
reservation.
28. 84 N.M. 629, 506 P.2d 786 (1973).
29. Id. at 632, 506 P.2d at 789.
30. "In an attempt to determine whether Indian immunity from process is necessary
in this case to protect the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled
by them, we have surveyed a number of cases and other authorities." Id. at 631, 506 P.2d
at 788 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 632, 506 P.2d at 789.
32. Although the court does not mention the tribe's service statute, that detail is in-
dependently discoverable. The reservation involved is the Navajo Reservation, see 506
P.2d at 786, and the applicable service rule reads as follows:
The summons and complaint shall be served by any officer of the Navajo Police
Department or any other person authorized by the Court by delivery of a copy to the
defendant or someone over the age of sixteen (16) living at the usual residence of the
defendant or working at the usual place of business of the defendant. If personal ser-
vice cannot be effected within five days, notice may be given by registered mail. If ser-
vice by registered mail cannot be effected, then notice may be given by publication in
the Navajo Times for three (3) weeks."
NAVAJO R. Civ. P. 3 (1977).
There are a number of discongruities between this rule and the one which obtains in
[Vol. 10
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As the earlier hypothetical case indicates, Williams suggests
otherwise.
Bad Horse v. Bad Horse33 is a Montana Supreme Court case
that cites State Securities, Inc. v. Anderion"4 and holds service
proper. Once again, most of the opinion deals with the ability of
the state court to take subject matter jurisdiction over the suit. In
the puzzling end to the opinion, the court first suggests that per-
sonal jurisdiction is unnecessary in this case,3" then suggests that
once process has been served and notice had, any legal impedi-
ment to the service becomes moot." The court concludes without
analysis that "Indian country is not a federal enclave off limits to
state process service."3" Perhaps Bad Horse is explained by the
frustration the Montana Supreme Court feels with the doctrine of
tribal sovereignty. As recent United States Supreme Court opi-
nions have held, the doctrine, and perhaps the frustration, are
here to stay. 9 Given that tribal sovereignty and the Williams in-
fringement test are clearly parts of the law, Bad Horse is best
relegated to historical obscurity."0
New Mexico courts. See N.M. R. Civ. P. 4 (1980). E.g., private process servers need not
be approved by the New Mexico court, except for certain writs; a 15-year-old may receive
the New Mexico summons; mailed service in New Mexico must also be posted; notice by
publication in New Mexico is more carefully regulated.
The facts are not stated completely enough to know whether the actual service in the
case satisfied the New Mexico rule but not the Navajo rule.
33. 163 Mont. 445, 517 P.2d 893, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 847 (1974).
34. Id., 517 P.2d at 897.
35. "A court may have jurisdiction to grant a divorce even though the defendant has
not been served personally .... ." Id., 517 P.2d at 896.
36. "Once the district court has assumed jurisdiction over the subject matter and
process has been properly served, the defendant cannot throw up a shield around herself
by claiming that the state process server cannot pierce the exterior boundaries of an In-
dian reservation and serve civil process therein." Id., 517 P.2d at 897.
37. Id. It is here that the court cites State Securities.
38. The myth of Indian sovereignty has pervaded judicial attempts by state courts to
deal with contemporary Indian problems. Such rationale must yield to the realities of
modern life .... Only by throwing off the strictures of Indian sovereignty can state
courts enter the arena and meet the problems of the modern Indian. If Congress and
the federal appellate courts have a better solution, let them come forward.
Id.
39. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
40. The Montana court apparently agrees, as Bad Horse was overruled in In re Mar-
riage of Limpy, 636 P.2d 266 (1981). In Limpy the court deferred to a Northern
Cheyenne Tribal Court advisory opinion that the tribal court had jurisdiction over
divorce actions between reservation residents and that Montana law would apply. Having
found that a suitable tribal forum existed, the court found its concerns expressed in Bad
Horse met, and denied state subject matter jurisdiction.
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The latest case holding on-reservation service proper, and the
most thoughtful of the three, is LeClair v. Powers4l from the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma. In that case Georgia LeClair sued
her husband, Alexander, for divorce. Alexander was served pro-
cess in Indian country by an Oklahoma sheriff. Alexander did
not appear at several hearings or at the divorce trial. At a con-
tempt hearing he challenged the court's jurisdiction over his per-
son and lost. He .then sought a writ of prohibition against
Powers, the trial judge.
The supreme court denied the petition for the writ, citing Bad
Horse and State Securities. Once again the court does not clearly
separate subject matter and personal jurisdiction, especially in
that part of the opinion where the earlier cases are cited. This
time, however, the petitioner, defendant in the original trial, was
able to bring home to the court the separate nature of his argu-
ment: "service by the State according to its own procedures is
asserted as an interference with the self-governing activities of the
Indian tribe." 2 However, the court finds no conflicting tribal
service of process rule. 3 Since the Ponca Tribe has a so-called
"Court of Indian Offenses" whose rules are set by federal regula-
tion,4 the court is correct in finding that no tribal self-
government interest is implicated.
In summary, then, with respect to service of process, two
thoughts are in order. First, the next court to deal with the issue
might well take the issue as one of first impression as the
precedents, both ways, are so weak. The cases finding service im-
proper are limitable by narrow bits of Arizona and Colorado law
or merely state a conclusion in dictum. The cases finding service
proper are not careful in their analysis (State Securities), are
distorted by a fear of tribal self-government (Bad Horse), or are
limited to the unusual case of Code of Federal Regulation courts
(LeClair). Thus, a case that will apply the Williams test
thoughtfully to the application of state service laws on the reser-
vation is awaited.
Second, in many cases the legal difficulty is avoidable. Most
tribes have service of process rules, many of which are similar to
41. 632 P.2d 370 (Okla. 1981).
42. Id. at 375. The court reports that LeClair's cited authority is State ex rel. Merril
v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1979) and Benally v. Marcum, 89 N.M. 463, 553 P.2d
1270 (1976), two extradition cases. Apparently none of the state cases holding or sug-
gesting that service is impermissible was used.
43. 632 P.2d at 376.
44. See id. and 25 C.F.R. pt. 11.
[Vol. I0
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the corresponding state rules. It is possible that acting in confor-
mity with the tribal rule will also satisfy the requirements of the
state rule. If this is the case, then the rather knotty problems
herein discussed disappear as the laws of both jurisdictions have
been followed. If subject matter jurisdiction exists in the state
court and if process has been served in accordance with the tribal
rule and if such service satisfies the state rule, then the suit may
proceed with no fear of infringement.
While most legal problems disappear when service is ac-
complished under both tribal and state law, several practical
problems remain. First, tribal law must be discovered, and that
is, generally speaking, a more difficult legal research task than
usual. Tribal codes are often not published or distributed widely.
They are not found in many law firm libraries. To provide some
aid to the practitioners in this regard, Appendix II contains the
service of process rules of several tribes.
Once the tribal rule is found, the correspondence must be in
the right direction. That is to say, the legal problems disappear
only if the state method is more liberal than the tribal method. If
the opposite is true, 11 then service under the tribal method does
not automatically satisfy the state rule. The attorney must be
careful to serve under tribal law in a way that will satisfy the state
law.
One further practical problem remains. Tribal law may require
service by a tribal law enforcement officer. Such an official may
be reluctant to serve process with respect to a suit brought in state
court. All law enforcement officers are busy; many do not care
for civil process serving and service may be expensive, especially
on a large reservation. Furthermore, the tribal officer may not be
permitted to serve for a state court suit. "6 All in all, it may be dif-
ficult to arrange the practical details of service pursuant to the
state law in conformity with the tribal law.
4 7
45. See, e.g., the service rules of New Mexico and the Navajo Tribe, discussed supra
in note 32. In most ways, the state rule is more generous than the tribal and hence service
under the tribe's rule will satisfy the state's. That appears not to be the case, however,
with respect to service by publication.
Service by publication raises, as always, due process inquiries. In the case of the Navajo
rule, the relevant provision is found in the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8).
46. This is, of course, a matter of tribal law.
47. But see Nenna v. Moreno, 132 Ariz. 565, 647 P.2d 1163 (Ariz. App. 1982), in
which the plaintiff used a Papago official to serve process. Service, however, was to no
avail, as the court of appeals held there to be no subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
suit under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. But see Natewa v.
Natewa, 84 N.M. 69, 499 P.2d 691 (1972). See also Francisco v. State, 113 Ariz. 427, 556
P.2d 1 (1976) (en banc) and especially n.1.
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Knotty legal problems on the one hand; practical difficulties on
the other. Service of process on the reservation with proper
respect for the defendant's right to due process and the tribe's
right of self-government would appear to be an issue especially
susceptible to state-tribal cooperation.
III. Execution of Judgment on the Reservation
Consider now the other end of the litigation spectrum. Suppose
there is valid subject matter jurisdiction in state court and that
service has been properly made-perhaps off-reservation,
perhaps on-reservation pursuant to both state and tribal law. The
case goes to judgment for the plaintiff and the defendant does
not voluntarily pay the debt. Furthermore, the defendant's only
nonexempt"s assets lie on the reservation. How may the plaintiff
enforce the judgment? Once more, we must distinguish between
Public Law 280 and non-Public Law 280 states.
Enforcement of Judgment in Public Law 280 States
Theoretically the question of the enforcement of judgment in
Public Law 280 states is as easy as the question of service of pro-
cess. "Why," a novice might ask, "would Congress grant to the
states the power to serve process, hear a case, and determine the
outcome under state law, but stop short of allowing enforcement
of the judgment obtained?" The answer is that the last step,
unlike the first several, directly affects Indian land, and Con-
gress, even while enacting Public Law 280, was protective of In-
dian land rights. Witness 25 U.S.C. § 1322(b), a proviso to the
jurisdictional grant of section 1322(a): "Nothing in this section
shall authorize the.., encumbrance.., of any real or personal
property . . . belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe [etc.]
that is held in trust by the United States . . . ."9 Hence, even in
48. Exempt under state or tribal law? Compare N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-10-1 to -11
with 7 Navajo Tribal Code § 711 (1956). The question of the enforceability in state court
of a tribal exemption statute is similar to the enforceability in state court of a tribal pro-
hibition of self-help repossession. Three cases have held the tribal statute enforceable in
state court. Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 117 Ariz. 192, 571 P.2d 689 (Ct. App. 1977);
Chischilly v. G.M.A.C., 96 N.M. 264, 629 P.2d 340 (Ct. App. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 96 N.M. 113, 628 P.2d 683 (1981) (Note that the Supreme Court opinion revers-
ing was published before the court of appeals decision reversed. Hence ordinary research
techniques do not show the reversal.); Jim v. C.I.T. Fin. Serv. Corp., 87 N.M. 362, 533
P.2d 751 (1975).
49. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (1976). This section was enacted as part of the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968, but it followed exactly the wording of 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b), which was
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Public Law 280 states, execution on a state court judgment
presents difficulties and requires the judgment creditor to seek
out nontrust property.
Unfortunately for the creditor, much Indian property is held in
trust. Most tribal property is,"0 as are all allotments where the
trust period had not expired before Congress extended it in-
definitely in 1934.1' Therefore, even in Public Law 280 states, the
plaintiff may well obtain only a personal judgment, unen-
forceable against all of the defendant's property of any value.
Section 354 of Title 25 makes it clear that it is the fact that the
property is in trust which forbids the enforcement of a judgment
on the property. Section 1322(b) in turn makes it clear that Public
Law 280 has no effect on this protection. Whether the judgment
is obtained in a Public Law 280 or a non-Public Law 280 state,
trust property will be protected from execution. This explains
why all the cases to be discussed involving enforcement of state
judgments will concern nontrust property-wages, personalty,
and so forth. With respect to this nontrust property, execution
should be permitted in Public Law 280 states as the proviso in
section 1322(b) does not apply.
Enforcement of Judgment in Non-Public Law 280 States
In non-Public Law 280 states,52 the impact of the bar to en-
cumbrance of trust property equals that discussed above. Again,
part of the original Public Law 280. For a precursor of these sections, see 25 U.S.C. §
233, which was a Public Law 280-like statute, applying only to New York and passed in
1950:
provided further, That nothing herein contained shall be construed ... as subjecting
any such lands ... to execution on any judgment rendered in the State courts, except
in the enforcement of a judgment in a suit by one tribal member against another in the
matter of the use or possession of land ....
See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 679 n.14 (1974).
50. See F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 471-507 (1982). The only importance of this
restriction is for plaintiffs who obtain judgment against a tribe. Tribal defendants are not
discussed in this paper and shall not be, as suits against tribes are generally barred by
sovereign immunity. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
51. while there were many allotment acts, most allotments were made pursuant to
the General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 389, 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1976). The period of the
trusteeship was originally twenty-five years, id., but was extended indefinitely by the In-
dian Reorganization Act, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U.S.C. § 462 (1976). The prohibition against
the enforcement of judgments on allotted land is found in 25 U.S.C. § 354 (1976).
52. The possible preemptive effect of Public Law 280 in nonassuming states is ig-
nored here, Kennerly to the contrary notwithstanding. See supra text accompanying notes
14-16.
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much reservation land is held in trust, either for the tribe or for
individual Indians, and hence will be immune from execution.
What of nontrust property: perhaps personalty, perhaps property
freed from the restraint, perhaps property held in fee simple, as
with the Pueblos? May a valid state court judgment be enforced
against such property?
It is easier to see an infringement here than in the case of ser-
vice of process. Putting aside the discongruity, hypothesized
earlier, between state and tribal service statutes and assuming
notice conforming to due process, it is difficult to see that mere
service of process-notifying the defendant of the pending
lawsuit-infringes upon the Indians' right to make their own
laws. But with enforcement of judgment, the case seems clearer.
Of course, if the tribe prohibits or restricts execution, garnish-
ment, replevin, or the like, the arguments are the same as those
discussed at length above. Even if the tribe is silent with respect
to execution, or even if it permits it by the same process the state
is using, an infringement should be found. The concern now is
not merely with the procedure of enforcement, although there are
due process inquiries here as well. Enforcement amounts to a
seizing of property on the reservation, which constitutes a sub-
stantial intrusion into reservation affairs. It is relatively nondis-
ruptive of reservation life to permit a suit, pursuant to an off-res-
ervation transaction, to continue. Discontinuity of service statutes
aside, service is proper. Personal judgment may be entered and
may, of course, be paid voluntarily. The act of converting the
personal judgment into an interest in reservation property,
however, should not withstand Williams scrutiny.
The most recent case is in accord with this view. In Joe v. Mar-
cum," U.S. Life sued Joe in New Mexico court over an off-
reservation debt. Default judgment was entered. U.S. Life then
attempted to garnish Joe's wages, earned on the reservation and
53. 621 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1980). See also Airvator, Inc. v. Turtle Mountain Mfg.
Co., 329 N.W.2d 596 (N.D. 1983). The issue in Airvator was whether the state court had
subject matter jurisdiction over a suit on a contract where the breaching party is a cor-
poration 51% Indian-owned. The North Dakota Supreme Court held that there was sub-
ject matter jurisdiction in state court, id. at 604. In dicta, the court then contemplated the
eventual judgment: "We do recognize that, in the event a judgment is served in favor of
Airvator against Turtle Mountain Manufacturing, enforcement and execution of that
judgment in state court may be difficult because the corporation's assets may be located
on the Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation." Id. at 605. The court appears to recom-
mend that enforcement be sought in tribal court, with subsequent full faith and credit
concerns. See id. and infra, text and notes 69-89.
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owed to Joe by Utah International, a non-Indian, Delaware cor-
poration. Joe sought an injunction in federal court against the
garnishment. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's grant of the injunction. It is fair to say
that the circuit court expressed some reluctance to reach this
result; 4 nonetheless, the court held that "to allow the present
garnishment proceeding to stand would impinge on tribal
sovereignty."1
5 5
The court looked to a number of factors in reaching this con-
clusion. The preemptive effect of Public Law 280 was considered,
although it was not dispositive. So too was the sovereignty of the
Navajo Tribe mentioned. The key element, however, was that
"to permit a state court of New Mexico to run a garnishment.., on
the reservation ... would thwart the Navajo policy not to allow
garnishment, ' '56 a policy the court had earlier found legitimate."
The court found the Navajo's policy against garnishment to be
embodied in silence.
5 8
The court was not persuaded by the argument that the garnish-
ment was ancillary to the underlying suit on the off-reservation
debt. A new, on-reservation party, the garnishee, was involved. A
new on-reservation res, the wages due, was sought. A new on-
reservation service of process was required. All in all, the court
found the garnishment to be a new suit, sufficiently separate
from the initial suit to invoke the Williams test and the subse-
quent barrier to the state activity.
Two cases prior to Joe v. Marcum had dealt with the issue of
execution on the reservation. Little Horn State Bank v. Stops"
involved, like Joe v. Marcum, an on-reservation garnishment
pursuant to a judgment entered on an off-reservation debt. The
Montana Supreme Court did not find the silence of the tribe,
here the Crow, on the question of garnishment to be as relevant
as did the Tenth Circuit, later, in Joe v. Marcum. "Until the
Crow Tribe has provided a means of such enforcement or acted
in some manner within this area, we fail to see how tribal self-
54. "[W]e recognize that there is authority to the contrary, and that an argument
can be made that Joe should not be allowed to use the Navajo Reservation as a sanctuary
to insulate himself from state court garnishment proceedings arising from an off-
reservation transaction with a non-Indian lending agency." Id. at 361.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 362 (emphasis in the original).
57. Id. at 361.
58. Id. at 362.
59. 170 Mont. 510, 555 P.2d 211 (1976).
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government is interfered with by assuring that reservation Indians
pay for their debts incurred off the reservation.
' 60
At the heart of the Stops case is the court's view that a judg-
ment that is not enforceable is "absurd." Judgments, of course,
are ordinarily not enforceable in other jurisdictions, but the court
refers to full faith and credit as the judgment creditor's protec-
tion when def-endant is in other states.6' The court, however, does
not explain what protection the plaintiff gets when the
defendant's property is in a foreign country. Thus, the Montana
court's frustration is again with the sovereignty of the Crow
Tribe-no foreign country, to be sure, but hardly a mere part of
Big Horn County as the court suggests.
The other pre-Joe v. Marcum enforcement of judgment case is
Annis v. Dewey County Bank 6 in which the non-Indian creditor
bank attempted to execute judgment on defendant's on-
reservation personal property. As always, the bank's execution
was pursuant to a valid judgment on an off-reservation debt. In-
stead of challenging the execution in state court, as Stops had un-
successfully tried, Annis sought an injunction in federal court, as
Joe was to do several years later. Annis, as did Joe, persuaded
the federal court to grant the injunction, the court reasoning very
similarly to the Tenth Circuit. Annis's victory, however, was pyr-
rhic, for the bank counterclaimed in federal court on its state
court judgment. After granting Annis's injunction, the district
court turned to the bank's counterclaim, found that no indepen-
dent jurisdictional base was needed, 63 and granted judgment for
the bank. The federal marshal was then sent to execute on
Annis's cattle, free of any Williams barrier.
The bank's clever and successful tactic, which was inexplicably
not copied by U.S. Life in Joe v. Marcum, places the defendant
resisting execution in a quandary. He can litigate the matter en-
tirely in state court, even though the right to be free from execu-
tion is a federal one. Or, fearing the unhappy state reception that
Stops received, the defendant may seek protection of the federal
court, there to face the creditor's counterclaim, a la Dewey
County Bank, Even in the Tenth Circuit, where Joe v. Marcum
appears to have settled the issue, the options are risky, for the
60. Id., 555 P.2d at 214.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 69-82.
62. 335 F. Supp. 133 (D.S.D. 1971).
63. None existed, of course, as the parties were not diverse and no federal question
was raised by the bank's counterclaim on the state court judgment.
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counterclaim is available even though the injunction should sum-
marily be granted, and a state court might always refuse to follow
the federal court of appeals."
The way out of this quandary is not apparent. One possibility
is to find that the counterclaim is not permitted because it does
not arise out of the same transaction as the debtor's suit for the
injunction. But the Annis court's analysis of this issue appears
technically flawless.65 It might also be found that the federal mar-
shal may not execute on what is essentially a state court judg-
ment. Once again the court is correct in saying, sub silentio, that
Williams is a bar only to state interference with tribal activity.
64. Hence the debtor faces the unsavory choice between litigating in state court or
facing the Annis-counterclaim in federal court. The choice, however, remains the
debtor's. It would appear that the creditor with a state court judgment has very limited
access to federal court, unless the debtor opens the courthouse door by seeking the federal
injunction. The federal court registration statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1963, allows registration
only of judgments from other district courts, so a state court judgment may be converted
into a federal one only by bringing suit thereon. But Threlkeld v. Tucker. 496 F.2d 1101
(9th Cir. 1974) held: "Inasmuch as the federal courts are not appendages of the state
courts, a federal court cannot enforce a state-court judgment without first independently
establishing its own jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. [Citing cases.]
Here diversity jurisdiction provides the basis for subject-matter jurisdiction .... " Id. at
1104.
The result of 28 U.S.C. § 1963 and the Threlkeld holding is that a plaintiff with a state
court judgment will be able to seek enforcement in federal court, thereby avoiding
Williams v. Lee, only if there is diversity, federal question, or special statutory jurisdic-
tion. Assume the parties are not diverse. (For inspection of the question whether federal
court jurisdiction exists when the parties are diverse and the suit would be barred by
Williams v. Lee in state court, compare Poitra v. DeMarrias, 502 F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1974)
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 934 (1975) and American Indian Nat'l Bank v. Red Owl, 478 F.
Supp. 302 (D.S.D. 1979) (yes) with Hot Oil Serv., Inc. v. Hall, 366 F.2d 295 (9th Cir.
1966) and Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966)
(no). The new edition of Cohen's Federal Indian Law, supra note 50, prefers the latter at
317.) Furthermore, there is generally no statute giving federal court jurisdiction over such
suits.
Is there federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331? It appears settled that
there is not since the federal question must appear in the plaintiff's complaint. See
COHEN, supra, at 311. Thus, in Williams v. Lee, as a matter of federal law, the Arizona
court cannot hear the case. Nevertheless, a federal court could not adjudicate the debt
unless the parties are diverse. The suit must go to tribal court, as the Supreme Court sug-
gests. 358 U.S. at 222. Likewise, there would not seem to be a federal question, allowing
for suit in federal court on a state court judgment, merely because the state judgment is
not enforceable on the reservation as a matter of federal law.
65. See Brill, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 59 NEB.
L. REv. 631 (1980). The author of this article has assured me that the district court's
reasoning in Annis on this point is sound. Cf. Plant v. Blazer Fin. Serv., Inc., 598 F.2d
1357, 1363 (5th Cir. 1979) (counterclaim on underlying debt is compulsory in suit for
truth in lending violation). But cf. Valencia v. Anderson Bros. Ford, 617 F.2d 1278, 1291
(7th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 452 U.S. 205 (1981) (the opposite).
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Here, however, the debtor could gain at least some support from
the Ninth Circuit, which has held that a federal court may not
hear a diversity suit which would be barred by Williams from
state court."
Finally, a series of cases has been decided involving the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act where the
obligor is found on a reservation and the support-seeker is found
in another state.67 Generally speaking, these cases are unhelpful
on the issue under discussion because the courts seek some off-
reservation, in-state activity so as to create subject matter
jurisdiction in the state court. Most often it is not found.68
In summary, the Joe v. Marcum view appears correct, with the
potentially substantial practical limitation posed by the Dewey
County Bank counterclaim.
Enforcement of State Court Judgments in Tribal Court
It was suggested earlier, as a practical way around the problem
of service of process on the reservation, that process be served
under both state and tribal law. A similar but more complex solu-
tion exists with respect to enforcement of the judgment: the judg-
ment creditor may attempt to have the state court judgment en-
forced in tribal court. This raises interesting questions of full
faith and credit and comity. 69
Comity may be discussed rather quickly. That doctrine repre-
sents the respect one government shows to another, in this in-
stance by recognizing the other government's court judgments.7 0
The question is one of the local law of the jurisdiction granting
comity, here the tribe. A judgment creditor may always take the
state court judgment to the tribal court seeking comity, i.e., argu-
ing to the tribal court that it ought, as a matter of tribal policy,
recognize and enforce the state's judgment. It is not at all unlike-
66. Hot Oil Serv. Inc. v. Hale, 366 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1966).
67. Nerma v. Moreno, 132 Ariz. 565, 647 P.2d 1163 (Ct. App. 1982); State ex rel.
Flammond v. Flammond, 621 P.2d 471 (Mont. 1980); State ex rel. Three Irons v. Three
Irons, 621 P.2d 476 (Mont. 1980); Natewa v. Natewa, 84 N.M. 69, 499 P.2d 691 (1972).
68. Nenna, Flammond and Three Irons all found jurisdiction lacking. In view of the
earlier critical comments in the text concerning the reluctance of the Montana Supreme
Court to accept the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, it should be noted that Flammond and
Three Irons embrace the doctrine with some enthusiasm. "In recent years American In-
dian tribes have strived to become independent and responsible government entities.
There is every reason to hope, therefore, that the Blackfeet Tribe will afford the petition-
ing wife a viable remedy in its courts." 621 P.2d at 474. Justice Harrison retains the old
view. See Flammond, 621 P.2d at 474-76 (Harrison, J., dissenting).
69. See Ragsdale, Problems in the Application of Full Faith and Credit for Indian
Tribes, 7 N.M. L. REv. 133 (1977).
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ly that the tribal court will grant such recognition, perhaps after
some formal or informal hearing to determine that the state judg-
ment was obtained fairly. The existence vel non of comity, of this
hearing and the procedures for it, are governed by tribal law,
restricted, as always, by the Indian Civil Rights Act's guarantees
of due process.7
More problematical is full faith and credit, a federal policy that
might be imposed on the tribes, if Congress is of a mind to do
so.72 The legislation that implements full faith and credit is 28
U.S.C. § 1738. 73 This statute, set out in the margin, 74 does not
mention Indians, but contains the word "territories," which has
been interpreted in some cases to mean Indian tribes."
There are several difficulties with the application of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 to Indian tribes. First, of course, is the unlikely interpreta-
tion of "territory" to mean Indian tribe, surely not an interpreta-
tion of any sweeping use.76 Second, there is 25 U.S.C.
§ 1911(d), the Indian Child Welfare Act's full faith and credit
clause,77 which calls a tribe a tribe and shows the clarity with
which Congress legislates when it wishes to. Furthermore, 25
U.S.C. § 1911(d) would not have been necessary had Congress
believed that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 applied to tribes.78
70. See generally Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
71. After Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), the tribal court will
police its own compliance with the Indian Civil Rights Act.
72. The Constitution's full faith and credit clause, article IV, § 1, does not mention
"Indian tribe" and hence does not bind them, Lohnes v. Cloud, 254 N.W.2d 430, 433
(N.D. 1977). It appears that had it done so, it would be one of the "general terms" of the
Constitution which would apply to tribes, even under Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376
(1896).
73. A related statute is 25 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1976), which, in Public Law 280 states,
grants "full force and effect" to tribal ordinances and customs not inconsistent with state
law. This statute does not mention judicial proceedings.
74. The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any... State, Territory or
Possession . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the
courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 947, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976).
75. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 n.21 (1978); Mackey
v. Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100 (1855) (same word; different statute); Jim v. CIT Fin.
Serv. Corp., 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
77. The United States, every State, every territory or possession of the United States,
and every Indian tribe shall give full faith and credit to the.., judicial proceedings of
any Indian tribe applicable to Indian child custody proceedings to the same extent that
such entities give full faith and credit to the... judicial proceedings of any other entity.
Act of Nov. 8, 1978, Pub. L. 95-608, tit. I, § 101, 92 Stat. 3071, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d)
(1976).
78. Naturally, the later statute could be explained as Congress' attempt to leave the
matter free of doubt in an area of special concern.
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The greatest difficulty in the application of 28 U.S.C. § 1738 to
tribes is that its interpretation, in this article's context, is left en-
tirely in the hands of the tribal court. There is no appeal from the
tribal court into the federal system, 79 and Martinez removed the
possibility of collateral attack under the due process clause of the
ICRA. s° Thus, if a tribe determines that it is not bound to
recognize a state court judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, that in-
terpretation of federal law is final, with no possibility of Supreme
Court or other federal court review.
Several cases have discussed full faith and credit issues with
respect to Indian tribes, but all of the reported cases are the other
way, i.e., in the context of state enforcement of tribal
judgments."' Those cases are split, with the majority granting
recognition more often as a matter of comity than of full faith
and credit.8 2
79. State ex rel. Flammond v. Flammond, 621 P.2d 471, 474 (Mont. 1980) (dicta).
80. There may be an application of the theory of Dry Creek Lodge v. Arapahoe &
Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 682, 685 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1110, reh. denied,
450 U.S. 960 (1980), to this situation. The holding of that case was that where no tribal
forum is available, the federal court may provide relief under the Indian Civil Rights Act,
notwithstanding Martinez. In the hypothetical case, the plaintiff presents the judgment to
tribal court, which refuses to grant full faith and credit to the state judgment. This is akin
to, but distinguishable, from the denial of any tribal forum. If the court should find
otherwise, then the judgment plaintiff could bring suit in federal court alleging that to
deny full faith and credit violates the due process clause of the ICRA. (The ICRA has no
full faith and credit clause.) If the plaintiff prevails, then judgment would be entered in
the federal court, which judgment could be executed upon the reservation with no
Williams problem. Such would be an unfortunate extension of Dry Creek-Lodge, already
an unfortunate case, see Laurence, Swallowing the Bitter Pill of Dry Creek Lodge, 14
AM. INDIAN L. NEWSLETrER 30 (1981), and a judicial engrafting of a full faith and credit
clause onto the ICRA.
81. See note 48, supra.
82. In re Lynch's Estate, 9Z Ariz. 354, 377 P.2d 199 (1962) (theory for recognition
unclear); Begay v. Miller, 70 Ariz. 380, 222 P.2d 624 (1950) (same); Wakefield v. Little
Light, 276 Md. 333, 347 A.2d 228 (1975) (comity); Wippert v. Blackfeet Tribe, 654 P.2d
512 (Mont. 1982) (comity); In re Marriage of Limpy, 636 P.2d 266 (Mont. 1981) (comity);
State ex rel. Stewart v. District Court, 609 P.2d 290 (Mont. 1980); In re Doe, 89 N.M.
606, 555 P.2d 906, 913 (Ct. App. 1976) (full faith and credit); Airvator, Inc. v. Turtle
Mountain Mfg. Co., 329 N.W.2d 596, 605 (N.D. 1983) (no full faith and credit) (dictum);
Lohnes v. Cloud, 254 N.W.2d 430 (N.D. 1977) (no full faith and credit; no comity) (dic-
tum); Red Fox & Red Fox, 23 Or. App. 393, 542 P.2d 918 (1975) (comity); Barrick v.
Johnson, 286 N.W.2d 523 (S.D. 1979) (statute provides for recognition in the precise cir-
cumstances of the case); In re Buehl, 87 Wash. 2d 649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976) (full faith
and credit); Makah Indian Tribe v. Clallam County, 73 Wash. 2d 677, 440 P.2d 442
(1968) (tribal custom given "full force and effect"). There are a series of old federal cases
arising in Indian Territory or Oklahoma, then in the Eighth Circuit, now in the Tenth:
Hayes v. Barringer, 168 F. 221 (8th Cir. 1909); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir.
1905); Cornells v. Shannon, 63 F. 305 (8th Cir. 1894); Standley v. Roberts, 59 F. 836 (8th
Cir. 1894); Exendine v. Pore, 56 F. 777 (8th Cir. 1893); Mehlin v. Ice, 56 F. 12 (8th Cir.
1893).
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In summary, then, a plaintiff with a valid state court judgment
that must be enforced on the reservation may attempt enforce-
ment in a number of ways:
(1) Ignoring the reservation, the judgment creditor might at-
tempt to enforce the judgment under state law, assuming the
sheriff may be convinced of the propriety of such a notion. 3 Joe
v. Marcum reasons correctly that this attempt constitutes an in-
fringement on the tribe's self-government.
(2) The judgment creditor might approach the tribal court in-
formally, seeking direct execution under tribal law. Tribal execu-
tion of a state court judgment is not a tidy combination,"4 but the
generally unpretentious tribal courts might well accept the idea.
As noted above, the creditor should expect a hearing of some sort
to determine that the state court judgment was fairly obtained.
(3) The judgment creditor might approach the tribal court
more formally, bringing suit in tribal court on the state court
judgment, arguing that it should be recognized under the doctrine
of comity."5 Comity is a flexible doctrine flowing from sovereign
states and should be appealing to a tribal court, especially when
the state in turn grants comity to tribal judgments, a theme of
reciprocity seen in the state court opinions. 6
(4) The judgment creditor might bring suit in tribal court,
arguing that full faith and credit must be given under 28 U.S.C. §
1738. In some cases, this argument, more formal than the last,
might prevail where comity would not. A tribal court, reluctant
to enforce the judgment of a hostile state but still sensitive to the
obligation under a federal statute, might reach this result. Still,
given the ambiguity of 28 U.S.C. § 1738, such a court would
probably be able to avoid full faith and credit as well as comity
and refuse recognition.
(5) Were a tribe and state to be especially cooperative, the
tribe might have a registration procedure whereby suit on the
state judgment would become unnecessary. 7 The judgment
creditor would merely file the judgment with a tribal official, and
83. One of the attractions of garnishment is that the sheriff need not be involved.
The writ is sought from and issued by the clerk, off-reservation, and in many states may
be served on the garnishee by a private party.
84. And conceivably could raise Indian Civil Rights Act due process questions.
85. See Wippert v. Blackfeet Tribe, 654 P.2d 512 (Mont. 1982).
86. See Little Horn State Bank v. Stops, 170 Mont. 510, 511, 555 P.2d 211, 212
(1976).
87. Cf. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 806.245, which permits tribal judgment to be registered in
state court.
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execution would then proceed under tribal law. The model statute
is the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.88
Conclusion
This article began by noting a number of similarities between
service of process and execution of judgment. The discussion
above has disclosed an additional similarity, for in each case it
was noted how knotty problems could be solved by tribal-state
cooperation. Such cooperation, not a hallmark of state-Indian in-
teraction in the past, seems to be an idea whose time has come. 9
If it grows and attacks the question of state court litigation in-
volving reservation Indians and their property, then perhaps this
article, which makes no pretense of being the last word on the
subject, will be, instead, the last notice taken by anyone concern-
ing the problem.
88. Note that § I of the U.E.F.J.A. makes only judgments entitled to full faith and
credit registerable.
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Appendix I
Statutes and Regulations
A. Public Law 280.
-28 U.S.C. § 1360: "The listed states have civil jurisdiction over causes of
action between Indians or to which Indians are parties to the same extent that
they have jurisdiction over other causes of action and those civil laws that are of
general application to private persons or private property .... " Trust property
may not be encumbered. Mandatory transfer of jurisdiction exists for:
1. Alaska
2. California
3. Minnesota, except Red Lake
4. Nebraska, except perhaps Omaha. (Compare State v. Goham, 187
N.W.2d 305 (1971) with Omaha Tribe v. Village of Walthill, 460 F.2d 1327 (8th
Cir. 1972)).
5. Oregon, except Warm Springs
6. Wisconsin, except Menominee (See Governor's Proclamation of
2/19/76.)
-25 U.S.C. § 1322(a): The United States has consented to the conferring of
jurisdiction of the nature allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 1360 in other states where the
occupying tribe consents. The states listed below have assumed some degree of
jurisdiction:
1. Florida, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 285.16
2. Idaho, for seven subject areas including domestic relations; more with
tribal consent. Idaho Code § 67-5101
3. Iowa, for civil causes of action on Sac and Fox, Iowa Code Ann. § 1.12
4. Montana, by governor's proclamation, at tribal request and with
county's consent. Mont. Code Ann. § 2-1-301
5. Nevada, with tribal consent, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.430
6. North Dakota, with tribal consent, N.D. Cept. Code § 27-19-01
7. Utah, with tribal consent, Utah Code Ann. § 63-36-9
8. Washington, partial geographic and subject matter jurisdiction, Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. § 37.12.010. See Washington v. Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. 463
(1979).
-Case law. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Kennerly v.
District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971). Secondary sources: F. COHEN, FEDERAL IN-
DIAN LAW (1982), at 362-72; Goldberg, Public Law 280, etc. 22 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 535 (1975).
B. 25 U.S.C. § 233-specifically transfers jurisdiction, with enumerated limita-
tions, to New York courts.
C. 25 C.F.R. pt. 11, governing courts of Indian offenses, extends its jurisdic-
tion over the thirty-one tribes enumerated in § 11.1. The regulations apply, at
least temporarily, to IRA tribes, 25 C.F.R. § 11.1(d), but do not apply where
state law is "effective." Id. § 11.1(c).
Civil jurisdiction is given in 25 C.F.R. §§ 11.22-11.32C. Generally, jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians is by consent. Actual notice of the suit is required by §
11.22.
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Appendix II
Selected Tribal Ordinances Governing Service
of Process and Execution of Judgments*
Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of Fort Peck
Sec. 30 Judgments.
(a) Payment. Any judgment of the Courts against an Indian, which is not
paid by the judgment debtor within the time set by the Courts, shall be paid out
of funds deposited to the credit of the judgment debtor at the Fort Peck Agen-
cy, upon a determination by the Secretary of the Interior or his authorized
representative that the payment will not result in hardship to the judgment deb-
tor, and on such terms and conditions as the Secretary may prescribe.
Blackfeet Tribe
Sec. 1 Jurisdiction
The Tribal Court and the State shall have concurrent and not exclusive
jurisdiction of all suits wherein the defendant is a member of the Tribe which is
brought before the Court. No judgment shall be given on any suit until the
defendant has been given ample opportunity to appear in Court in his defense.
Evidence of the receipt of notice shall be kept as part of the records in the case.
In all civil suits the complainant may be required to deposit with the Clerk of
Court a fee or other security in reasonable amount to cover the cost and
disbursements in the case.
Sec. 5 Payment of Judgments from Individual Indian Moneys
[This section is similar to Lummi § 3.4.10]
Colorado River Tribes
Sec. 108.-Notices and Service.
a. Any notice or process to any person or party which is required or may be
given or served under any provision of this Code shall be served in accordance
with one of the following provisions as applicable.
(1) If to a natural person, by delivering it to him personally, or by leaving it
at his usual place of residence with a member of his family of the age of
eighteen (18) years or older.
(2) If to any other than a natural person, by delivering it personally to any
owner, proprietor, officer, director, partner, member, associate, prin-
cipal stockholder, manager, foreman, or supervisor of such person, or
by leaving it at any of its offices or places of business with its principal
employee, agent or representative at that place.
b. Any notice, complaint, pleading, instrument, or process of or by any
* The valuable aid of Bryce Wildcat, research assistant at the National Indian Law
Library in Boulder, is cheerfully acknowledged.
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party to any civil trial, case or proceeding before any of the courts of the Tribes
may be served by any person of the age of eighteen (18) years or older who is
not a party thereto. Upon the request of any party in such civil matter, such ser-
vice will be made for him within the Reservation by the Judicial Clerk, or an
assistant Judicial Clerk, and the expense thereof will be charged to that party.
Any service or execution hereunder shall be verified by a certificate of the per-
son making the service or execution, stating upon whom, when, how and where
it was made. That certificate shall be filed with the court.
c. Alternative methods of service.
(1) Registered Mail. If any person or party has not made an appearance in a
trial, case or proceeding pending before the courts of the Tribes, so that
the provisions of Section 108 a (3) are not applicable, and that person or
party cannot be located within the Reservation but the whereabouts of
that person or party outside the Reservation are known, service may be
obtained by depositing a copy of the notice or process in the U.S. mails,
addressed to the person or party to be served, by registered or certified
mail with request for a return receipt signed by the addressee only.
(2) Publication. Service by publication shall be allowed only in or for a
trial, case or proceeding affecting specific property or status or other
proceedings in rem.
Havasupa Tribe
2.11 Service of Process
The copy of the summons and the copy of the complaint shall be served
together. Service shall be made as follows:
A. Upon any individual by delivering a copy of the summons which shall
indicate the hearing date, and of the complaint to him personally.
B. If service of the summons and complaint cannot be personally made,
within the jurisdiction of the Havasupal Tribal Court, a copy of the
summons and complaint shall be mailed by Registered or Certified Mail,
Return Receipt requested, to the defendant's last known post office ad-
dress by the Clerk of the Tribal Court.
2.19 Satisfaction of Judgment
A. Where the judgment is for a sum of money, the collection of such judg-
ment shall be by execution, if the judgment has not been satisfied in
total within twenty (20) days after entry of judgment or an installment
agreement has not been reached.
B. The party in whose favor the judgment has been entered shall have the
right to avail her/himself of all remedies available in the Tribal Court
for the enforcement of such judgment.
2.20 Judgment-Stay of Entry and Execution-Installment Payment
A. When judgment is to be rendered and the party against whom it is to be
entered requests it, the Tribal Court Judge shall:
1. Inquire fully into the earnings and financial status of slch party
and shall have full discretionary power to stay the entry of judg-
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ment, and to stay execution except in cases involving wage claims.
2. To order partial payments in such amounts, over such period, and
upon such terms, as shall seem just under the circumstances and
as will assure a definite and steady reduction of the judgment until
it is finally and completely satisfied.
B. Upon a showing that such party has failed to meet any installment pay-
ment without just excuse the stay of execution shall be vacated.
Lummi Tribe
Chapter 3.3 Notification
3.3.01 Notice and Service.
Civil actions may be instituted either by voluntary appearance and agreement
of the parties or by service upon the defendant of a true copy of the filed com-
plaint and notice either personally or as provided herein. The notice shall be at-
tached to the copy of the complaint, and cite the defendant to be and appear
before the Court at the time and place therein specified, which shall not be less
than 20 days from the date of serving of the complaint and notice. Such service
may be made by means of certified mail, return receipt requested. Evidence of
the receipt of notice shall be kept as part of the record in case.
3.3.02 Publication.
Upon a showing by the complainant to the Reservation Court that diligent
efforts were made to serve the complaint and notice on the defendant pursuant
to section 3.1.02 and that service could not be made for sufficient reasons, the
judge may allow service to be made by posting copies of the notice and com-
plaint in two public places on the reservation for three weeks and by publication
of a copy of the notice and complaint once a week for three consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the vicinity of the Lummi Indian Reser-
vation. In such case the return date shall be not less than 30 days from the date
of first publication.
3.4.10 Payment of Judgments.
Whenever the Lummi Reservation Court shall have ordered payment of
money damages to an injured party and the losing party refuses to make such
payment, within the time set for payment by the Court, and when the losing
party has sufficient funds to his credit at the agency office to pay all or part of
such judgment, the Superintendent shall certify to the Secretary of the Interior
the record of the case and the amount of the available funds. If the Secretary
shall so direct, the disbursing agent shall pay over to the injured party the
amount of the judgment, or such lesser amount as may be specified by the
Secretary, from the account of the delinquent party.
Navajo Tribe
Sec. 604. Notice and Opportunity to Appear
No judgment shall be given on any suit unless the defendant has actually
[Vol. I0
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received notice of such suit and ample opportunity to appear in court in his
defense. Evidence of the receipt of notice shall be kept as part of the record in
the case.
Sec. 704. Payment from Individual Indian Moneys
[See Lummi § 3.4.10]
Sec. 705. Writs of Execution-Generally
The party in whose favor a money judgment is given by the Courts of the
Navajo Tribe may at any time within five years after entry thereof have a writ of
execution issued for its enforcement. No execution, however, shall issue after
the death of the judgment debtor. A judgment creditor may have as many writs
of execution as are necessary to effect collection of the entire amount of the
judgment.
Sec. 712. Execution Prior to Judgment
(a) Any chattel, legal title to which is in the plaintiff, or upon which the
plaintiff holds a lawful lien may be taken into custody and delivered to the Clerk
upon a writ of execution issued prior to judgment, upon motion of the plaintiff,
for good cause shown and upon posting bond or making a cash deposit in an
amount determined by the Court to be sufficient to compensate the defendant
for any damages he may suffer as a result of wrongful execution. Plaintiff shall
deposit such additional sum as the Court may fix to cover costs of the execution
and of the maintenance of the property while in custody.
Oglala Sioux Tribe
Sec. 20. Jurisdiction.
The Oglala Sioux Tribal Court shall have jurisdiction of all suits wherein the
defendant is a member of the tribe or tribes within their jurisdiction, and of all
other suits between members and non-members which are brought before the
court by stipulation of both parties. No judgment shall be given on any suit
unless the defendant has actually received notice of such suit and ample oppor-
tunity to appear in court in his defense. Evidence of the receipt of the notice
shall be kept as part of the record in the case. In all civil suits the complainant
may be required to deposit with the clerk of court a fee or other security in a
reasonable amount to cover costs and disbursements in the case.
Sec. 22. Judgments in Civil Actions.
In all civil cases, judgments may consist of an order of the court awarding
money damages to be paid to the injured party, or directing the surrender of
certain property to the injured party, or the performance of some other act for
the benefit of the injured party.
Red Lake Tribe
Sec. 3-Service
A. The service of a summons on a person residing or being on the Red
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Lake Indian Reservation shall be made by delivering the original sum-
mons, with a copy of the complaint attached, to the defendant personal-
ly or to a responsible person at the residence or usual abode of the de-
fendant by a police officer of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, or by any
other enrolled adult Indian not a party to the action or by certified mail
with a return receipt requested.
B. The officer or person causing the service to be made shall file a return
on a copy of the summons, to the Court, which shall show the place,
date, time and person on whom the service was made.
Sec. 11-Payment of Judgment from Individual Indian Moneys.
[This section is similar to Lumnmi § 3.4.10]
Sec. 14-Judgments: Method of Enforcement
Where a judgment requires the payment of money or the delivery of real or
personal property, it may be enforced in these respects by execution. Where it
requires the performance of any other act, a certified copy of the judgment may
be served upon the party against whom it is given, or the person or officer who
is required thereby or by law to obey the same; and if he refuses he may be
punished by the Court as is provided in Section 19, Chapter 2, Code of Indian
Offenses.
Salish and Kootenai Tribes
Sec. 5. Service.
1. The summons and complaint shall be served on the defendant by per-
sonal service, whenever possible, within five days, or by mail if the defendant
cannot be located. Service by mail shall be made by the Clerk of Court, by
registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. The return receipt shall be
kept in the docket as evidence of the receipt of notice. Personal service shall be
made by a law enforcement officer delivering the summons and complaint to the
defendant in person. The officer making personal service shall promptly return
to the Clerk an affidavit of service when service has been effected, and this af-
fidavit shall be kept in the docket as proof of personal service. If the officer can-
not effect personal service within five days, he/she shall so notify the Clerk of
Court why service was not possible.
Shoshone-Bannock Tribe
Sec. 2.4 Service
The Clerk of the Fort Hall Indian Court shall furnish the plaintiff with a
copy of the Complaint and a copy of the Notice showing the time and place of
hearing. The Clerk shall then enter proof of service upon the original Notice and
as provided in Chapter 2 Civil Procedures Section 2.5. If the defendant does not
personally appear in the Law and Order office and accept service of the Notice
together with a copy of the Notice and Complaint, the Clerk shall furnish the
original Notice together with a copy of the Notice and Complaint to the Indian
Police who shall serve a copy of the Notice and Complaint upon each individual
defendant by delivering a copy of the Notice and the Complaint to him per-
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sonally or by leaving the copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of
abode with some person over the age of 18 years then residing therein. The of-
ficer serving the copy of the Complaint and Notice of hearing shall then make
proof of service upon the original Notice and pursuant to the provisions of
Chapter II, Civil Procedure Section 2.5 Proof of Service.
Section 2.5 Proof of Service
The clerk or the officer serving a copy of the Complaint and Notice of hear-
ing upon a defendant, shall upon making service, sign a verified statement on
the back of the original Notice that they personally served a copy of the Com-
plaint and Notice upon the named defendant and shall indicate the time and
date of service. The clerk or officer shall then affix their signature to the state-
ment.
Ute Tribe
Rule 2. Commencement of Action; Service of Process.
a) Commencement of Action. A civil action is commenced by filing a com-
plaint and serving a copy of such on the defendant or defendants as provided
herein. The court shall have jurisdiction from such time as both the complaint is
filed and properly served upon the defendant and a return of service is filed with
the clerk.
b) Service of Process. Service of process shall consist of delivering to the party
served a copy of the complaint along with a summons, which need not be issued
by the judge or clerk, which advises the defendant that he is required to answer
the complaint within 20 days or a default judgment will be entered against him.
1) The return of service shall be endorsed with the name of the person serv-
ing and the date, time, and place of service and shall be filed with the
clerk.
2) Service may be made on a party by delivering the required papers to the
party himself or upon some person of suitable age and discretion over
14 years old at the party's home or principal place of business, or on an
officer, managing agent or employee, or partner of a non-individual
party.
3) Service by publication may be made upon order of the court for good
cause shown by publishing the contents of the summons in a local
newspaper of general circulation at least once per week for four weeks
and by leaving an extra copy of the complaint or paper with the court
for the party.
4) Service may be made by any law enforcement officer or other person,
not a party, 18 years of age or older.
5) Service upon a person otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Ute
Indian Tribal Court may be made anywhere in the United States; other-
wise, service shall be made within the exterior boundaries of the Reser-
vation.
6) If a person personally refuses to accept service, service shall be deemed
performed if the person is informed of the purpose of the service and
offered copies of the papers served.
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